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ABSTRACT 
Preparedness for operations in both the Irregular Warfare (IW) and Major 
Combat Operations (MCO) environments is essential given a tumultuous and 
unpredictable Contemporary Operational Environment (COE).  This thesis is an 
effort to provide a solution to the U.S. Army’s emerging trend toward uni-focused 
operations fixated on IW.  In this thesis, we propose recommendations for 
change to the current Army force structure centered on the Brigade Combat 
Team (BCT) and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model through which 
these units are cycled for refit, training, and deployment.  These recommended 
modifications are intended to optimize the Army for its role as a deterrent force, 
and to assist the Army in its ability to proficiently conduct operations in the IW 
and MCO environments either consecutively or simultaneously. 
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I. BURNING THE WAGONS 
On January 17, 1781, British commander of southern operations, Lord 
Charles Cornwallis, suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of American 
Brigadier General Daniel Morgan during the Battle of Cowpens in South Carolina.  
In order to increase the survivability of his numerically inferior force and to exploit 
British weaknesses, Morgan had, over time, tailored his units to execute a style 
of warfare asymmetric to the accepted practices of the day.  At Cowpens, 
Morgan devised a plan to defeat Cornwallis through the utilization of tactics that 
capitalized on the British leader’s disdain for the American militia.  Morgan’s 
intention was to lure the British troops into an engagement area by placing his 
militia out front where they would appear vulnerable.  The American militiamen 
were instructed to fire multiple volleys until threatened by the advancing Brits, at 
which time they were to feint a retreat, hopefully drawing the British within range 
of Continental regulars that lay in wait out of sight.  The plan worked as designed 
with British casualties surpassing one hundred killed and eight hundred captured, 
compared with the Continental Army’s twelve killed and sixty wounded.1  Desiring 
revenge for this defeat, Cornwallis readied his army to give chase to Morgan in 
what would become a sprint to the ford site on the Dan River bordering North 
Carolina and Virginia.  Realizing his conventional forces required a large, slow-
moving logistical tail in order to operate in a manner consistent with what they 
had become accustomed, Cornwallis chose to break with this modus operandi, 
and forced his units to adopt the bare-bones logistical support of Morgan’s army.  
To achieve this, Cornwallis ordered the burning of “surplus wagons, baggage, 
supplies and equipment so that he could move faster.”2  This, however, resulted 
in disastrous failure for two reasons.  First, despite Cornwallis’ best efforts, 
neither he nor his men were able to catch Morgan before he crossed the Dan 
                                            
1 Fred Cook, “Struggle for the South,” From Troy to Entebbe. Ed. John Arquilla. (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1996), 86. 
2 Ibid.  
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River.  Second, and more telling, is that his units did not have the additional 
supplies needed to support their conventionally-oriented requirements.  This 
shortcoming later resulted in Cornwallis’ defeat by General Nathanael Greene at 
the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, when Cornwallis’ troops were to again face a 
conventional enemy requiring a conventionally-oriented force structure and 
processes.  Having transitioned his men to face an irregular, asymmetric enemy 
in Morgan, he did not have the essentials required to successfully transition his 
men back to symmetrically face the conventional forces of Greene.  
Morgan and his men were accustomed to operating in a manner 
asymmetric to the contemporary practice of large, resource-intensive, Napoleonic 
forces.  Cornwallis, however, in an attempt to transform his forces through the 
burning of the logistics necessary to support his element was ill-fitted for such 
operations, and by doing so figuratively burned with his supplies the essence of 
what gave his troops their identity; one which was not easily regained.3  This 
conundrum is as old as American warfare itself and has raised its head time and 
again throughout the history of the Army.  Most recently this has been observed 
in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) where American General Purpose Forces 
(GPF) struggle to mold themselves into units capable of meeting the 
requirements needed to defeat insurgents and trans-national jihadists. 
This situation begs the following questions:  Is the U.S. Army today 
headed down the same path as Cornwallis in the American Revolution?  And, by 
focusing on counter-insurgency (COIN) tactics while overlooking historical core-
competencies associated with major combat operations (MCO), is the Army in 
essence ‘burning the wagons’ of MCO, and with that, the identity and expertise of 
its general purpose forces? 
                                            
3 Idea initially introduced by Professor Hy Rothstein of the Naval Postgraduate School during 
History of Special Operations class session. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to 
conduct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the 
introduction of a new order of things. 
    -Niccolo Machiavelli4 
A. BACKGROUND 
On March 20, 2003, the United States (U.S.) led “coalition of the willing”5 
began its ground offensive en-route to Baghdad for the purpose of deposing Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein and liberating the people of Iraq from his oppressive 
regime.  A mere twenty days later, on April 9, 2003, Hussein’s Ba’athist 
government fell as crowds of cheering Iraqis gathered in the streets of their 
capital city to greet American forces.6  Pre-war planning seemingly presumed this 
euphoria of the liberated would persist, and that the Iraqi people would quickly be 
capable of self-governance.  An example of this optimism is found in the U.S. 
Central Command (USCENTCOM) PowerPoint presentation depicting the initial 
Phase IV troop strength of 270,000 personnel could incrementally be reduced to 
5,000 within a thirty-two to forty-five months time span following the fall of 
Hussein’s regime.7  This stated timeline would have allowed for the vast majority 
of units to return to home station, and for the Army to resume “business as 
usual.”  This scenario was not inconceivable given the rapid success of 
                                            
4 Thinkexist.com, “Niccolo Machiavelli Quotes,” 
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/there_is_nothing_more_difficult_to_take_in_hand/14342.html 
(accessed May15, 2008). 
5 John King, “Bush: Join 'coalition of willing',” CNN.com, November 20, 2002, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/ (accessed May 2, 2008). 
6 Anthony Shadid, “Hussein's Baghdad Falls,” Washington Post Foreign Service, April 10, 
2003; http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A1320-
2003Apr9&notFound=true (accessed May 2, 2008). 
7 Joyce Battle and Thomas Blanton, “Top Secret Polo Steps,” The National Security Archive, 
February 14, 2007, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm (accessed 
May 12, 2008). 
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Operation Desert Storm and the limited force requirement of the Balkan 
campaign which were both fresh in the minds of senior military and civilian 
Department of Defense leaders.  However, more than five years and 4,000 
casualties later we know this to have been a gross underestimation of actual 
events.  Iraqi elation quickly gave way to the reality of lawlessness, internal strife, 
ethnic hostility between rival Sunni and Shi’ia tribes, and the introduction of Al-
Qaeda in Iraq.  Once assumed by government officials to be a relatively 
straightforward, conventional undertaking, the situation in Iraq quickly digressed 
into a complex, protracted irregular war (IW) requiring a sizeable and long-term 
U.S. ground force presence.  As of July 2008, U.S. Army troop strength in Iraq 
numbered thirteen Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), reduced from a high of 
twenty during the “surge” period of the previous eighteen months.8  This 
unforeseen, prolonged, and modified force demand has placed great strain on 
the U.S. Army, its soldiers, and its ability to maintain units postured for 
conventional major combat operations (MCO).9  Virtually the entire Active 
Component, Reserve Component, and Army National Guard are presently being 
utilized to execute the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and a great deal of 
discussion regarding the Army’s breaking point has arisen.  Recently, Army Chief 
of Staff, General George Casey Jr. shed some light on this in his testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee: 
The cumulative effects of the last six-plus years at war have left our 
Army out of balance, consumed by the current fight and unable to 
do the things we know we need to do to properly sustain our all-
volunteer force and restore our flexibility for an uncertain future.10 
                                            
8 ”Length of Tours, Number of BCTs in Iraq to be Reduced by July, Casey Says,” AUSA 
News, April 01, 2008, http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptAUSANews.nsf/byid/PGRH-7CMMPP 
(accessed May 2, 2008). 
9 The term Major Combat Operations is meant to describe combat operations between state-
actors where tactical and material capabilities are similar, and are focused on offensive and 
defensive operations intended to defeat the designated military of a government for the purpose 
of forcing the capitulation of said government as well as its constituents.  
10 “Length of Tours,” AUSA News, April 01, 2008. 
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General Casey’s comments regarding “…restor[ing] our flexibility for an 
uncertain future” highlights the current counterinsurgency (COIN)11 centric focus 
that we believe is degrading the Army’s ability to ready itself for full spectrum 
operations.12  Gian Gentile reinforces this in his article, Misreading the Surge 
Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities:  
The Israeli experience in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 should 
warn Americans against having an Army that has become so 
focused on irregular and counterinsurgency warfare that it can no 
longer fight large battles against a conventional enemy.13 
Additionally, Carl Munoz of Inside the Air Force notes in his article, 
JFCOM Chief Says Training Too Focused on COIN, Irregular Warfare:  
The outgoing head of U.S. Joint Forces Command this week joined 
a chorus of other high-ranking military officials who claim the 
Pentagon has become too enamored with counterinsurgency and 
irregular warfare as opposed to conventional military campaigns.  “I 
think the lesson is partly learned, but not completely learned, that 
we really have to look at all the forms of warfare and not get so 
focused on one that we are not able to do the others,” JFCOM chief 
Air Force Gen. Lance Smith.14 
These concerns are at the heart of this thesis.  We concur with the senior 
military officials and believe that the Army, under the current system, cannot 
remain prepared for full spectrum operations providing that COIN continues to 
dominate the Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) and the training calendars of 
the Army en bloc. 
                                            
11 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines 
counter-insurgency as: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic 
actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.  Also called COIN.” 
12 Full Spectrum Operations is the Army’s Operational Concept. FM 3-0, Operations, 3-1 
states: “Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations 
simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, 
accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.” 
13 Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” 
World Politics Review. March 4, 2008, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1715 
(accessed May 3, 2008).  
14 Carlo Munoz, “JFCOM Chief Says Training Too Focused on COIN, Irregular Warfare,” 
Inside the Air Force, October 19, 2007, http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2007/October/10252007/ 
10252007-16.htm (accessed April 29, 2008).  
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There is, however, a contrary vision within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) as noted by Josh White in his May 2008 Washington Post article, Defense 
Secretary Urges Military to Mold Itself to Fight Iraq-Style Wars.  In this article 
White writes that: 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates implored the U.S. military 
Tuesday to prepare more for fighting future wars against insurgents 
and militias such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than 
spending so much time and money preparing for conventional 
conflicts.15 
Additionally, Gates commented “the U.S. military ‘would be hard-pressed 
to launch a major conventional ground operation elsewhere in the world at this 
time,’ but he added: ‘Where would we sensibly do that?’”16 
We understand that the dominant trend of future conflicts favors small, 
non-state actors who will seek to utilize asymmetric tactics rather than engage in 
traditional state-on-state, Cold War-era conflicts.  We do, however, respectfully 
disagree with Secretary Gates apparent devaluing of the importance for the 
sustainment of conventional capabilities.  Although the choice to conduct a 
“major conventional ground operation” is not currently sensible, this negates the 
reality that our adversaries will most likely act when we are least prepared.  In a 
2003 Time magazine article titled Is the Army Stretched Too Thin? authors Mark 
Thompson and Michael Duffy ask the impending question: “Where would the 
Pentagon turn if it had to rush additional combat troops to the 38th parallel?  
Might a lack of ready reinforcements force Washington to consider using nuclear 
weapons to save South Korea from defeat?”17  Kim Jong Il’s South Korea is just 
one example of numerous threats that we must be fully prepared to engage and 
defeat.  However, others loom larger in the international spectrum, notably 
                                            
15 Josh White, “Defense Secretary Urges Military to Mold Itself to Fight Iraq-Style Wars.” The 
Washington Post, May 14, 2008.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy, “Is the Army Stretched Too Thin?” Time, August 24, 
2003. 
 7
Russia, Iran, and China.  The United States’ preoccupation on the GWOT has 
most recently become apparent at the strategic level when it failed to detect 
Russian troop movements into Georgia.  According to one U.S. senior official, 
this was a result of “national technical means” being “pretty well consumed by 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan.”  The official continued to state: “I wouldn’t 
say we were blind, I would say that we mostly were focused elsewhere, unlike 
during the Cold War, when we’d see a single Soviet armor battalion move.  So, 
yes, the size and scope of the Russian move has come as something of a 
surprise.”18 
We concur with the need for having forces trained and competent in 
irregular warfare tactics, but feel there is a parallel and equally important need for 
troops prepared for major combat operations so that the United States’ response 
to international crisis is not constrained by the availability of forces, and its ability 
to see one conflict through to completion is not interrupted by a need for troops 
elsewhere. 
While strong evidence exists indicating the transferability of specific skills 
from irregular warfare to major combat operations, this does not apply to all skills 
necessary to win decisively.  Transitioning the Army for MCO will require time, 
equipment, and manning, none of which are readily available outside the current 
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process that is in every respect 
preoccupied with feeding the force rotation for the GWOT.  This current process 
continues to posture the Army to be a uni-focused force, and the ongoing 
struggle to fulfill global commitments toward a singular effort resultantly stifles 
preparedness for simultaneous dissimilar operations.19  If the U.S. needed to act 
militarily in defense of a sovereign state such as Georgia or Taiwan while 
                                            
18 Jonathan S. Landay, “U.S. Knew Georgia Trouble Was Coming, But Couldn’t Stop It.” The 
McClatchy Newspapers, August 11, 2008. 
19 The authors define simultaneous dissimilar operations as operations conducted 
concurrently in a single or multi-theater setting, against both Regular and Irregular Forces and 
differing in terms of the nature of conflict (i.e., IW and MCO).   
 8
presently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, where would the forces and MCO 
expertise necessary to respond and sustain these operations derive?   
The world is full of those who wish to do America harm, and will do so by 
whatever means available, particularly at the most inconvenient time 
(remembering that the enemy always gets a vote).  Therefore, in our view, the 
prudent course of action is for the Army to maintain forces prepared to counter 
any possible future threat at all times. 
B. PURPOSE/THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this study is to develop recommendations for change to 
the current Army force structure and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 
process of general purpose forces20 based on the Infantry, Heavy, and Stryker 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).  This includes both the Active Component and 
the Army National Guard.  These recommendations provide for the Army the 
ability to meet current operational personnel requirements, while maintaining a 
force that is prepared to respond along the continuum of full spectrum 
operations.  Although we believe the ARFORGEN process and the BCT 
organization are effective models for today’s Army, modifications are prudent in 
order to optimize for both current and future fights.   
Our thesis is as follows:  Since the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, 
general purpose forces have experienced a striking shift in focus from the 
conventional paradigm of skills required to win decisively in major combat 
operations, to the contemporary skill set necessary to succeed in the irregular 
warfare (IW)21 environment; in specific, the counterinsurgency environment of 
                                            
20 The IW JOC (2007) proposes the definition of general purpose forces as: “The regular 
armed forces of a country, other than nuclear forces and special operations forces that are 
organized, trained and equipped to perform a broad range of missions across the range of 
military operations.” 
21 JP 3-0 defines irregular warfare as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors 
for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.  Irregular warfare favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in 
order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” 
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Iraq.  This current focus, as noted by numerous senior-ranking military officials, is 
contributing to the distillation of the Army’s ability to remain prepared for future 
conventional major combat operations.  Although a great deal of emphasis on IW 
has been necessary to reduce tactical asymmetry22 between general purpose 
forces and contemporary irregular adversaries, continued neglect of historical 
core-competencies can potentially lead to a not-so-distant future when this 
asymmetry exists between U.S. forces and their conventional opponents. 
It is nearly impossible to imagine asymmetry between the U.S. and an 
adversary on a material level, and we are not implying this.  We are confident 
that the U.S. will possess a technological and material advantage well into the 
future.  The question we are addressing is, if allowed to continue on the present 
path, will U.S. Army training reflect the tactical and technical ability to fight and 
win in any future war?  Secretary Gates himself, in a speech given at the 
National Defense University on September 8, 2008 warned: 
Be modest about what military force can accomplish, and what 
technology can accomplish.  The advances in precision, sensor, 
information and satellite technology have led to extraordinary gains 
in what the U.S. military can do…But also never neglect the 
psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, 
which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain.23  
Fortunately, our adversary in Iraq allowed us the time needed to adjust our 
BCTs to irregular warfare operations.  It is not wise to assume, however, that this 
same grace period will be afforded to refocus our efforts while engaged in a high-
intensity conflict environment opposite a formidable conventional threat. 
                                            
22 The authors define asymmetric as: “1) Being unlike in a material sense; possessing or 
having access to a disproportionate amount of people and/or technology than an adversary.  2) 
Tactics, techniques, and/or procedures (TTPs) used by one or multiple actors in a conflict that 
seek to exploit an adversaries’ perceived weaknesses while avoiding an adversaries’ perceived 
strengths.”  The first portion of this definition is derived from email correspondence with Dr. Ivan 
Arreguin-Toft from 14 April 2008-17 April 2008.  In his correspondence Dr. Arreguin-Toft wrote 
that his “own use of the term [asymmetric] was nearly mathematical, and followed that of the few 
earlier scholars (Mack, 1975; Paul 1994) who used the same concept.  In my usage [Dr. 
Arreguin-Toft], the term literally means ‘different’…and refers mainly to material power.”    
23 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, U.S. Department of Defense. Speech given at the 
National Defense University, September 29, 2008. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The next chapter of this thesis (Chapter III) is a synopsis of present-day 
force structure and the ARFORGEN process that regulates the rotation of these 
forces through the refit, training, and deployment cycles.  In this chapter, we 
qualitatively compare the Heavy, Stryker, and Infantry BCTs in order to inform 
the reader on the similarities, differences, strengths, and weaknesses of each.  
Following this, the ARFORGEN process is explained as it exists in its current 
form.  Although this chapter may be superfluous for some, it is an essential step 
in establishing the framework for our argument, and serves as the foundation 
from which our recommendations for organizational reconstruction derive.   
Chapter IV begins with a brief introduction to the reasons we feel the 
aforementioned force structure and ARFORGEN process should be modified to 
meet the demands of the contemporary operational environment.  Supporting this 
is a quantitative analysis through a “zero-sum” game theory model between 
conflict type and force structure that provides us with the optimal ratio of BCTs 
dedicated to IW and MCO.  Additionally, a quantitative timeline is depicted 
projecting the loss of MCO expertise within the Army given the current propensity 
for IW operations.  Using the results of the zero-sum game, a recommendation 
for the transfer of HBCTs from the Active Component (AC) to the Army National 
Guard (ARNG) is introduced.  Given the need to replace these HBCTs with the 
prescribed IW-to-MCO force ratio, a linear optimization program is utilized to 
determine the appropriate organizational construct (either IBCT or SBCT) based 
on our assessment of the suitability of each for the IW environment.  In response 
to fiscal critics of this transformation, we quantitatively highlight the overall 
savings to the Army that this force structure modification will produce to counter 
procurement costs.  Lastly in this section, we propose recommendations by 
which the majority of the soldiers of the former HBCTs can be utilized in non-
traditional roles within the SBCT.  Next, we apply this modified force within the 
context of two independent ARFORGEN models tailored for either IW or MCO.  
In this we have developed separate timelines for the AC and ARNG of both the 
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IW and MCO tracks, and a sample interaction of the two given a scenario where 
MCO transitions into an IW environment, as in the case of OIF.  Finally, we 
provide brief recommendations to support the implementation of our proposal 
and to confront the challenges that will almost certainly arise. 
Chapter V summarizes the conclusions we have drawn based on the 
findings of our research, and addresses issues derived from within this thesis 
that are worthy of further exploration.  In this chapter we provide future students 
of this topic a roadmap for subsequent investigation.  This will hopefully increase 
the likelihood of this proposal to gain greater visibility at the congressional level 
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III. THE CURRENT ARMY PHILOSOPHY 
A. CURRENT ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE 
Brigade Combat Teams or BCTs “are the Army’s basic tactical maneuver 
units, and the smallest combined arms units that can be committed 
independently.”24  The BCT stems from the Army’s “plug and play” concept of 
modularity that allows it to “…better meet the challenges of the 21st century 
security environment and, specifically, jointly fight and win the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).”25   
 
Figure 1.   Current BCT Organization 
                                            
24 Department of the Army, FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 2-1. 
25 Andrew Feickert, “US Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for 
Congress, May 5, 2006: 9, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67816.pdf (accessed April 
29, 2008). 
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At present, the Army is organized into forty-three Active Component BCTs and 
twenty-eight Army National Guard BCTs as depicted in Figure 1 above.  The 
smaller size of the new BCT in comparison with those of the Division-era Army 
provides for increased numbers of available BCTs to commanders in order to 
support the high operational tempo of the contemporary environment (Figure 
2).26  As stated by Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, the goals for 
the new brigade design are to: 
Increase the number of combat brigades available to the Army 
while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal to or better 
than that of current division BCTs. 
Create smaller standardized modules to meet the varied demands 
of regional combatant commanders, and to reduce joint planning 
and execution complexities. 
Redesign brigades to perform as integral parts of the Joint team. 
This makes the BCTs more capable in their basic ground close 
combat role. They are able to benefit from other service support 
and to contribute more to other service partners.27  
There are three types of Brigade Combat Teams; they are the 
armored/mechanized Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), the lightly 
armored/motorized Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), and the Airborne, Air 
Assault and Light elements of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 
organized as depicted in Figure 3.28  In addition to their maneuver elements, 
each BCT has a fires battalion, a support battalion, and a reconnaissance 
squadron.  The combat support units of the HBCT and IBCT are the brigade 
special troops battalion (BSTB), whereas the SBCT has separate support 
companies under brigade control.29 
 
                                            
26 FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, XVI. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 2-7. 
 15
 
Figure 2.   Army Division to Unit of Action (UA) BCT Concept30  
 
 
Figure 3.   HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT Organizational Chart31 
 
                                            
30 “Modular Forces,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 7, 2006, 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed 
May 5, 2008).  
31 Ibid. 
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1. The Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) 
The Heavy Brigade replaces the separate armored, mechanized, cavalry, 
and balanced brigades of the previous division and corps organization.  The 
HBCT is organized around two Combined Arms Battalions (CABs), each 
comprised of two infantry companies, and two armor companies (Figure 4).  The 
CABs fight integrated with one another, and are supported by sniper teams, a 
scout platoon, and organic 120mm mortars.  In addition, the CAB has an organic 
engineer company consisting of three line platoons and one support platoon.  
The mission of the CAB is “to close with, and destroy or defeat enemy forces 
within the full spectrum of modern combat operations.”32   
The reconnaissance squadron of the HBCT provides intelligence to 
commanders while having the ability to defend itself against most threats.  The 
reconnaissance squadron is made up of one Headquarters and Headquarters 
Troop (HHT), and three Ground Reconnaissance Troops, each equipped with M3 
Cavalry Fighting Vehicles and M1114 armored HUMVEES.33 
The HBCT fires battalion is composed of two batteries of 155mm self-
propelled Paladins, and both the Q-36 and Q-37 counter-fire radars as well as 
four counter-mortar radars.   
The HBCT is the best protected, but slowest to deploy of the three BCTs.  
Due to its armored and mechanized platforms, it is the best option for opposing 
an armored enemy threat.34  HBCT strength is approximately 3,800 soldiers.35 
                                            
32 “Modular Forces,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 7, 2006, 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed 
May 5, 2008), A2. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid., A1. 
35 Ibid., A2. 
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Figure 4.   HBCT Organizational Chart to Company Level36 
 
 
HBCT Capabilities HBCT Limitations 
Conducting sustained operations in 
most environments 
High dependence on radio communications 
Accomplishing very rapid movement 
and deep penetrations 
Restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or 
dense forests 
Conducting security operations High usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly 
class III, V, and IX 
Conducting offensive and defensive 
operations 
Vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons 
Maintaining the ability to integrate 
light or SOF 
Footprint is usually larger than a lighter force 
Possessing mobile, protected 
firepower 
Fratricide of light forces is higher due to the inability to 
determine friend or foe unless mounted 
Providing digital SA down to vehicle-
level 
HBCT staff does not have an S3 air section to plan and 
oversee air assault operations 
Performing company-sized air 
assaults 
Possesses no organic gap crossing capability 
Table 1.   HBCT Capabilities and Limitations37 
 
                                            
36 “Modular Forces,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 7, 2006, 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed 
May 5, 2008), A1. 
37 Ibid., A3-A4. 
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2. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) 
The SBCT is organized around three infantry battalions, and although not 
as armored as the HBCT, it is easier to deploy while still offering greater mobility 
than the IBCT (Figure 5).  The SBCT is the largest of the BCTs with 
approximately 4,000 soldiers.   
Each of the SBCT rifle battalions has three rifle companies, and each 
company has three rifle platoons, organic 60mm and 120mm mortars, a sniper 
team, and a Mobile Gun System (MGS) platoon with three MGS vehicles.  The 
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) provides additional firepower 
with one 81mm/120mm mortar section, two sniper teams, and a reconnaissance 
platoon.38  The SBCT also has a reconnaissance squadron composed of five 
highly-mobile troops.  These five troops consist of one HHT, a surveillance troop, 
and three vehicle-equipped reconnaissance platoons.  These reconnaissance 
troops are organized into three platoons of four vehicles, and a mortar section 
with two mounted 120mm mortars.  The surveillance troop possesses numerous 
ground-based and air-based sensors to include the Prophet vehicle and 
unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms.   
The SBCT’s fires battalion has eighteen 155mm howitzers, and the 
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB) comes equipped with the Q-36 
and Q-37 radars.  Borrowing from the strengths of the HBCT and IBCT, the 
SBCT additionally has a company of engineers for mobility, and an anti-tank (AT) 
company with 9 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) vehicles.39  
                                            
38 “Modular Forces,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 7, 2006, 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed 
May 5, 2008), A7. 
39 Ibid., A7-A8. 
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Figure 5.   SBCT Organizational Chart to Company Level40 
 
 
SBCT Capabilities SBCT Limitations 
Three infantry battalions for maneuver (vs. only 
two in the HBCT and IBCT) 
The SBCT does not have the firepower or 
inherent protection of HBCTs 
Infantry battalions contain organic armor in their 
MGS platoons 
The SBCT requires more aircraft to deploy 
than an IBCT 
In-theater mobility The BSB does not have FSCs for each 
maneuver battalion 
Lower usage rate of class III supplies than the 
HBCT, with nearly the same mobility 
Possesses no organic gap crossing 
capability 
Greater survivability than an IBCT There is no BSTB for C2 of brigade troops 
Ability to conduct forced entry or early entry 
operations 
 
RS with organic HUMINT Soldiers  
Table 2.   SBCT Capabilities and Limitations41 
 
3. The Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) 
The IBCT is the “light” force and replaces the Airborne, Air Assault, and 
Light infantry division organizations.  Each IBCT is designed around two infantry 
battalions, but additionally has a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a 
brigade support battalion, and a brigade special troops battalion (Figure 6).  The 
primary function of the IBCT is in the role of the rapid deployment element.  
                                            
40 “Modular Forces,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 7, 2006, 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed 
May 5, 2008), A7-A8. 
41 Ibid., A9. 
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Through its airborne component, it is capable of forcible entry42 operations, and 
once on the ground, is prepared for the offensive immediately.43  Due to its “light” 
nature, the IBCT is the component designed to operate in restricted terrain 
inaccessible or unfeasible for the SBCT and IBCT, and is best suited for “high-
tempo offensive operations against conventional and unconventional forces.”44  
Each IBCT has approximately 3,400 soldiers.   
Every IBCT infantry battalion is comprised of a HHC, three rifle 
companies, and a weapons company.  The Headquarters Company provides a 
scout platoon, 81mm and 120mm mortar platoon, and a sniper squad, while the 
rifle companies have three rifle platoons, a weapons squad, and a 60mm mortar 
section.  The weapons company is the mounted asset of the IBCT, and is made 
up of four mounted assault platoons with three anti-tank vehicles each.   
The IBCT reconnaissance squadron is made up of two armored troops 
(M1114) and one dismounted troop, deployed by either fixed wing or rotary wing 
aircraft.  The IBCT fires battalion has two batteries of eight 105mm towed artillery 
pieces, one, Q-36 radar, and four counter-mortar radars.45   
                                            
42 JP 1-02 defines forcible entry as: “Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of 
armed opposition.” 
43 FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, A1. 




Figure 6.   IBCT Organizational Chart to Company Level46 
 
 
IBCT Capabilities IBCT Limitations 
Conducting small-unit operations The IBCT does not have the firepower, mobility, or 
inherent protection of HBCTs 
Conducting operations with armored, 
mechanized, or wheeled forces 
The two maneuver battalions of the IBCT move 
predominately by foot; organic vehicles must move either 
Soldiers or supplies. The BSB has only enough trucks to 
transport two rifle companies 
Conducting operations with SOF Infantry Soldiers are especially vulnerable to enemy fires 
and CBRN attacks while Soldiers are moving 
Taking part in amphibious operations With only two maneuver battalions, options are limited for 
retaining capabilities for a pursuit, exploitation, or reserve 
force 
Maintaining the ability to conduct 
forced entry or early entry operations 
Possesses no organic gap crossing capability 
Conducting air assault, air mobile, or 
airborne operations 
Soldiers of the IBCT require USAF support for airborne 
assault 
Maintaining BSB/FSC transportation 
assets that allow 4 rifle companies to 
be truck-borne for any operation 
For a brigade-level air assault, the IBCT requires the 
support of at least two combat aviation brigades 
Maintaining a RS consisting of both 
mounted and dismounted personnel 
 
Table 3.   IBCT Capabilities and Limitations47 
                                            
46 FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, A4. 
47 Ibid., A6. 
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B. CURRENT ARMY FORCE GENERATION (ARFORGEN) 
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the means by which the Army 
refits, trains and deploys its units.  According to Addendum H of the 2007 U.S. 
Army Posture Statement, ARFORGEN is the “structured progression of 
increased unit readiness over time resulting in recurring periods of availability of 
trained, ready, and cohesive units.”48  The stated purpose of ARFORGEN “is to 
achieve a sustained, more predictable posture to generate trained and ready 
modular forces.”49  In short, ARFORGEN is a cyclical process that categorizes 
units, at varying degrees of preparedness, into one of three pools (reset and 
train, ready, and available) in order to maintain a prepared and competent Army 
capable of sustaining protracted force requirements (Figure 7). 
ARFORGEN functions with BCTs in each pool executing a specific, 
prescribed set of tasks, each cumulatively resulting in a unit’s preparedness for a 
response to global requirements.  The “reset and train” pool is comprised of units 
that have redeployed from operations and are focused on manning, equipment 
readiness, professional military education, and individual/collective training.  
Units in this pool are not eligible for combat operations, but can be tasked with 
homeland defense-related requirements.  The “ready” pool units are focused on 
upcoming, mission-specific collective training as prescribed in their directed 
Mission Essential Task List (METL).  These units continue training on individual 
and collective tasks and take part in Unit Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) at 
one of the Army’s three Combat Training Centers (CTCs), while brigade, division, 
and corps staffs synchronize their planning efforts during Command Post 
Exercises (CPX) at the Battle Command Training Program.  These ready units, 
however, can be deployed in support of a troop surge.  Units in the “available” 
pool are fully prepared logistically and operationally for deployment, and are 
either awaiting deployment, or are deployed in support of full-spectrum 
                                            
48 Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter Schoomaker, “A Statement on the 
Posture of the United States Army 2007,” Addendum H, February 14, 2007. 
49 Ibid. 
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operations.50  The ARFORGEN process is centered on the modular BCT concept 
and includes all Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC), and Army 
National Guard (ARNG) forces.51  For the purpose of this thesis, however, we 
have chosen not to address the support brigades of the RC, but rather 
concentrate on the maneuver elements of the Heavy, Stryker and Infantry 
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) of the AC and ARNG.   
 
Figure 7.   Army Force Generation Model52 
 
 
                                            
50 FM 3-0, Operations, 3-1 states that “Full Spectrum Operations is the Army’s operational 
concept that combines Offensive, Defensive, Stability and Civil Support operations.” 
51 Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter Schoomaker, “A Statement on the 
Posture of the United States Army 2007,” Addendum H, February 14, 2007. 
52 Ibid. 
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According to the current ARFORGEN model illustrated in Figure 7, the 
Active Component (AC) has a three-year cycle in which the first year is in the 
reset and train pool, the second year is in the ready pool, while the third year is 
spent in the available pool where BCTs are prepared to conduct, or are 
conducting, worldwide deployment.  Conversely, the Army National Guard will 
spend four years in the reset and train pool in order to achieve the four-to-one 
dwell time ratio required by the Webb-Hagel Dwell Time Amendment attached to 
the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill.53  In the fifth year, BCTs in the ready pool 
are eligible for worldwide deployment, while those forces in year six will either 
deploy or engage in homeland defense or homeland security missions. 
It is the intent of Army leaders that the ARFORGEN process “reduce[s] 
uncertainty for soldiers, families, and the communities that support installations, 
improve[s] availability of trained and prepared forces for Combatant 
Commanders,” and “generate[s] a continuous level of BCTs, augmented by all 
required supporting organizations…”54 
                                            
53 Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) Press Release, “Bi-Partisan Legislation Calls for Adequate 
Dwell Time Between Overseas Deployments,” 
http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=278436 (accessed September 4, 2008). 
54 Honorable Pete Geren and General George W. Casey Jr., “A Statement on the Posture of 
the United States Army 2008,” Addendum E, February 26, 2008. 
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IV. RETHINKING THE CURRENT ARMY PHILOSOPHY 
We have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and 
planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our 
forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to 
challenge us. 
   -Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld55 
A. REASONS FOR CHANGE 
The previously described existing Army force structure and ARFORGEN 
model have proven themselves adequate in the short-term for concurrent, similar 
campaigns as evidenced by the difficult, yet acceptable sustainment of 
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, we have identified two major 
roadblocks to the Army’s ability to conduct simultaneous dissimilar operations.  
The first of these is the Army’s inability to transition itself from irregular warfare to 
major combat operations given its total force requirement in the current 
operational environment.  The second is the eventual loss of expertise in MCO 
due to the continued focus on IW operations.  Each of these will be addressed 
individually in the following paragraphs.  
In the next step of our argument, we utilize a two-by-two, zero-sum game 
theory model in order to illustrate a force structure and force orientation with dual 
capabilities, optimized to engage both irregular and conventional threats either 
separately or simultaneously.  This is necessary to quantitatively justify the best 
possible force ratio between IW and MCO elements.  Following this, we propose 
a timeline displaying the projected loss of MCO expertise within the battalion and 
brigade command and battle staffs if the Army continues its paradigm for fixating 
on a singular niche of warfare.  We have chosen the brigade and battalion 
                                            
55 Donald Rumsfeld, speech at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., January 31, 
2002, from U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 
Affairs), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html (accessed April 24, 
2008). 
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commands and battle staffs due to their roles as the primary command and 
control elements responsible for the planning and execution of training for 
subordinate elements.  We further argue that while some cognitive skills learned 
from one style of warfare (IW/COIN) may be transferable to another (MCO), 
mastery of skills, in particular those of maneuver commanders and field-grade 
executive and operations officers, should not be left to chance.  Field-grade 
officers and senior non-commissioned officers must be grounded tactically and 
technically in their respective form of war, be it conventional or irregular.  While 
conducting this study, we ask the question: At what point will brigade and 
battalion commanders and their respective staffs be so ingrained in IW that they 
lose mastery of MCO? 
Finally, we cover in depth our proposal for change to both the Army force 
structure and the ARFORGEN process based on the results of the 
aforementioned analysis.  
1. Game Theory 
Depicted in Figure 8 is a zero-sum game between two rational actors; the 
first being the U.S. and its choice of force orientation, and the second being 
adversaries of the U.S., and their choice of conflict in which to engage.56  There 
are two choices for both force orientation and conflict type: irregular warfare (IW), 
and major combat operations (MCO).  When determining the ordinal numbers 
associated with the relationship between force orientation and conflict type, we 
assessed the outcomes of the intersection, or strategic interaction of each on a 
scale from 1-10, with 1 being the worst outcome and 10 being the best.  Due to 
the United States’ distinct advantage in material strength, technical proficiency, 
and the symmetrical interaction of MCO vs. MCO, this is the best possible 
                                            
56 According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Game theory is the study of the 
ways in which strategic interaction among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the 
preferences (or utilities) of those players, none of which might have been intended by any of 
them.” Game Theory, published January 25, 1997, http: //plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/ 
(accessed September 25, 2008). 
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situation at present, and is therefore a value of 10.  Next on the scale is IW vs. 
IW with a value of 5.  As in the previous category, this is a symmetrical scenario, 
but is valued less because failure at IW against an irregular threat arguably does 
not carry with it the implication of a failure versus an adversarial nation-state, and 
the overall cost in both men and material is assumed to be less.  The third 
scenario is an MCO force in an IW campaign, much like the American Army’s 
experience in Iraq following the fall of Baghdad, or the continuing Russian 
debacle in Chechnya (Appendix A).  Although the cost of this situation can be 
high both economically and politically, it still remains less costly than the final 
scenario of this model, where an IW force finds itself engaged in major combat 
operations, as in the case of Israel during the July War of 2006 (See Appendix A 
and Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8.   Game Theory Model of IW vs. MCO Force Orientation57 
                                            
57 Miroslav Feix, “Game Theory [electronic resource]: Toolkit and Workbook for Defense 
Analysis Students,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.  
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Applying these aforementioned values in Miroslav Feix’s game theory 
toolkit, we found that the nine out of eleven combat scenarios will most likely be 
irregular, with the remaining two focused on MCO (Star “1” in Figure 8).  Based 
on this, the optimal force structure for the Army is seven-elevenths, or sixty-four 
percent of its force dedicated to IW, and thirty-six percent of its force dedicated to 
MCO (Star “2” in Figure 8).  Taking these fractions and applying them to the 
actual number of Army BCTs, this translates to forty-nine of seventy-six BCTs 
dedicated to IW, and the remaining twenty-seven focused on MCO.  In 
subparagraph B of this chapter, we will discuss how this can be implemented for 
optimization of the force.  
2. Brigade / Battalion Command and Staff Timeline 
Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Army’s Cold War-era 
paradigm for MCO has shifted in favor of IW operations necessary to combat 
insurgencies and the emerging threat from trans-national jihadist networks.  This 
shift, although needed, should not be in the form of a zero-sum game between 
MCO and IW.  We suggest that there is a need to balance the force between IW 
and MCO in order to maintain expertise for both within the Army.  Figure 9 
depicts five separate commissioned officer year groups (YG) based on that year 
group’s rank and position at the time of this shift.  The red line separating years 
2003 and 2004 represents the point in the fourth quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2003 
when it is estimated that all major ground operations resembling MCO in Iraq had 
ceased, and the programs of instruction (POIs) of the combat training centers 
(CTCs) as well as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
adopted an IW focus. 
 29
 
Figure 9.   Projected Timeline of MCO Expertise Loss 
 
For all year groups, year zero depicts commissioning and initial training.  
Years 1-3 are spent as a Lieutenant, years 4-9 as a Captain, years 10-15 as a 
Major, years 16-21 as a Lieutenant Colonel, and years 22-26 as a Colonel, with 
the officers term of service estimated to end in retirement following the twenty-
sixth year.  As is shown for YG 1980 (Brigade Commanders in 2004), the 
majority of their experience is grounded in MCO, with only the three final years of 
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their career spent conducting irregular operations.  For YG 1986 (Battalion 
Commanders in 2004), their formative years spent as company grade officers 
were saturated in MCO, leaving them ill-prepared for IW as battalion 
commanders, but better prepared than their predecessors for IW as brigade 
commanders.  Although approximately balanced in MCO and IW, the officers of 
YG 1992 (Brigade and Battalion staff officers in 2004) are at a disadvantage in 
terms of planning for IW operations, but represent the high water mark for the 
retention of knowledge in MCO due to the conventional focus of the Army at the 
time of their company command.  YG 1998 (Company Commanders in 2004) 
had perhaps the most difficult company commands of any year group due to their 
time in command having been spent transitioning to a style of warfare different 
than they experienced as company Executive Officers and Platoon Leaders.   
We estimate that YG 2004 (newly-commissioned Lieutenants in 2004) is 
the first YG of officers to have no experience with, or frame of reference for 
MCO, as little of their training and none of their real-world missions have included 
MCO.  Based on this timeline and given the Army’s continued propensity for IW, 
we have estimated that any knowledge sufficient to transform the force from IW 
back to MCO will be devoid by 2030 with the retirement of YG 2004 officers.  
Our following recommendations illustrate a proposed course of action 
which we believe will allow the Army to avoid this perilous situation by 
maintaining forces capable of meeting the challenges of our dynamic 
environment across the range of full-spectrum operations.  
B. PROPOSED MODIFIED ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE 
Currently the Army has forty-three active component BCTs of which 
eighteen are IBCTs, six are SBCTs, and nineteen are HBCTs.  The Army 
National Guard has twenty-eight BCTs of which nineteen are IBCTs, one is a 
SBCT, and eight are HBCTs.  Combined, the AC and ARNG have a total of 
thirty-seven IBCTs, seven SBCTs, and twenty-seven HBCTs (Figure 10). 
Although HBCTs have performed well in the IW environment, we are of the 
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opinion that their success is a consequence of strong, adaptable leaders, and not 
its suitability for the IW environment.  Additionally, due to the high operational 
tempo, and thus little time for maintenance and training other than theater 
specific tasks, the HBCT’s ability to remain prepared for MCO as the world’s 
preeminent armored and mechanized force is being hindered.  Due to this, our 
first recommendation is to transfer the vehicular capabilities from seven AC 
HBCTs to ARNG units that are presently organized in the IBCT and SBCT 
configuration (Figure 11).  This transfer of HBCT equipment to the ARNG allows 
one AC HBCT to assume the organization of a SBCT, and to receive transfer of 
Stryker vehicles from the single existing ARNG SBCT.   
 
Figure 10.   Current BCT Organization 
 
Four of the remaining six disbanded HBCTs will organize as SBCTs and 
require the procurement of new Stryker Brigade equipment.  The remaining two 
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BCTs of the seven will organize as IBCTs and procure either M1114 High 
Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) or Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicles.   
As will be shown later in this paper under the proposed MCO ARFORGEN 
model, it will be possible for these newly-acquired ARNG tracked vehicles to 
dwell at home station for longer periods than their active counterparts, and 
therefore serve as a deterrent to conventional opponents and remain prepared 
for response to armored threats.  
 
Figure 11.   Proposed Transfer of HBCTs from AC to ARNG 
 
The reasons for changing to the SBCT and IBCT Tables of Organization 
and Equipment (TO&E) are: 1) this allows these BCTs to deploy with greater 
ease and to be more responsive to global threats, 2) the equipment associated 
with the IBCT and SBCT is less intrusive and better suited for the IW 
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environment, 3) the wheeled vehicles associated with the IBCT and SBCT 
experience less wear on the paved surfaces of the urban environment than their 
tracked HBCT counterparts and have an overall decreased operating cost, and 
4) both the IBCT and the SBCT possess enhanced and markedly more robust 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities suitable for the 
information realm of the IW environment (Figure 12).   
 
Figure 12.   BCT Environmental Compatibility Chart58 
 
                                            
58 Major General Richard P. Formica, Director of Army Force Management, “The Army: 
Force Structure – Current to Future,” December 3, 2007, 
http://www.crprogroup.com/eventnotebook/Shaping%20the%20Force%20for%20web/Thursday%
20Dec%206/Doctrine%20and%20Oranization%20Panel/MG%20Richard%20Formica.pdf 
(accessed September 18, 2008). 
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It is understood that there will be procurement challenges for the states 
during the transfer of this equipment, and funding issues for the AC in obtaining 
the SBCT capabilities, but we feel all of this can be overcome once the need for 
this is recognized by military decision-makers and gains support from state and 
federal law-makers.  Arguments against this transformation will likely be hinged 
on the loss of survivability of the M1, M2, and M3 platforms, but we feel this is 
mitigated by the proven combat record of the Stryker and M1114 HMMWV, as 
well as the introduction of new vehicles like the MRAP; all of which are wheeled 
versus tracked platforms and better suited for un-intrusive, urban, IW operations.  
Additional opposition to this will likely come from the Armor and Mechanized 
Infantry communities that have long and distinguished histories based in 
platforms such as the M1 and M2/M3.  These Armor and Infantry soldiers from 
the former HBCTs should find it simple to transition to positions within the Mobile 
Gun System (MGS), Weapons, and Reconnaissance elements of the SBCT and 
IBCT, and progress through the IW track for the remainder of their careers.  This 
should be a fairly smooth process as the TO&Es of the BCTs are not drastically 
different.  Additionally, the SBCT is a mounted force, and the IBCT’s 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron as well 
as the Infantry battalion’s weapons companies are all mounted elements with 
existing positions coded for Armor officers (See Figure 13 and Appendix C).  As 
one example to better utilize all of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and 
junior enlisted soldiers of the former HBCTs, we propose that excess 19Ds and 
19Ks, in lieu of 11Bs, fill the positions within the Stryker vehicle crews 
(Driver/TC), thus allowing 11Bs typically tied to those platforms to act in a 
dismounted role.  A second example of this is utilizing the seventy-one 88M 
Specialists and Privates First Class, and thirty-three 88M Sergeants per HBCT 
that are surplus to serve as Stryker vehicle drivers.  Additional opportunities for 
the utilization of excess personnel in the filling of positions throughout the SBCT 
that would otherwise be vacant are illustrated by the comparisons of BCT Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOSs) in Appendix C.   
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As depicted in Figure 13, we estimate the effectiveness of the IBCT to be 
twice that of the HBCT, and the effectiveness of the SBCT to be four times that of 
the HBCT in terms of suitability for irregular warfare.  We arrived at these values 
through an assessment of the BCTs as viewed through the lens of the U.S. 
Army’s War-fighting Functions; Movement and Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, 
Sustainment, Command and Control, and Protection.  In each case, we assess 
the SBCT to be favored on all accounts, and the IBCT superior to the HBCT in 
terms of Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Sustainment, and Command 
and Control.  We also assume with the introduction of the Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected vehicles into the IBCT, that the gap in protection between the 
IBCT and HBCT will be negligible.  These values, though ordinal and subjective, 
signify our best effort to represent the capabilities of each BCT in numerical form.  
Using these values, we then conducted a linear optimization program which, 
based on the values assigned to IBCTs and SBCTs, indicates that, in order to 
optimize the structure of the IW component, the dominant strategy is the creation 
of three SBCTs and two IBCTs.  According to the linear program, we can only 
create two complete IBCTs, and three complete SBCTs from the pool of soldiers 
made available by the dissolution of the seven HBCTs.  We have, however, 
calculated the number of personnel necessary to create the two additional 
SBCTs needed to fulfill the ratio of IW to MCO forces indicated by the game 
theory model mentioned above.  As can be seen in Figure 13, the total force 
transformation will result in a deficit of 1,559 soldiers.  The military occupational 
specialties that are affected greatest are those of the lower-enlisted and junior 
NCO ranks from the maneuver elements.  The task of filling these critical 
shortages will most likely be assumed by the U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command (HRC) through the creative use of enlistment and re- enlistment 
bonuses and incentives, or reclassification through the Bonus Extension and 
Retraining (BEAR) Program. 
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Figure 13.   HBCT to IBCT/SBCT Linear Optimization Program 
 
A point of contention to this transformation will be the means for funding 
the procurement of new vehicles for the five SBCTs and two IBCTs.  We believe 
our proposed modified force structure and the new ARFORGEN cycle discussed 
later in this chapter partially address this concern.  Presently, four ARNG BCTs 
are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of OIF and OEF.  We propose 
removing two of these ARNG BCTs from the current rotation, leaving the total 
ARNG force requirement at two BCTs in support of IW (Figure 18).  We estimate 
that by doing this, the annual savings to the Army for individual pay alone (not 
including vehicle operating and maintenance costs as well as overall cost of 
deployment) would be in excess of $362 million dollars.  Each new SBCT 
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requires 317 Stryker vehicles at a cost of approximately $1.42 million each.59  
Without the removal of these ARNG BCTs, the total cost to the Army per SBCT 
for new Stryker vehicles would be approximately $450 million.  However, with the 
removal of the ARNG BCTs, the overall reduced cost to the Army will be 
approximately $88 million per SBCT.  In summary, each new SBCT’s vehicles 
will only cost the Army $88 million as opposed to $450 million (See Appendix B).  
Additionally, we propose the transformation of two BCTs to the IBCT 
organization; subsequently, the procurement of the MRAP vehicle is a logical 
supplement.  For argument sake, we assume a similar number of MRAPs will be 
needed to transport the smaller number of personnel in an IBCT due to the 
reduced carrying capacity of the MRAP as compared with the larger SBCT’s 
Stryker vehicles.  Assuming the IBCT will require approximately 317 MRAPs at 
roughly $500,000 each, the total procurement cost per IBCT will be an estimated 
$158.5 million.60  Considering the previously mentioned per annum $362 million 
savings with the removal of two ARNG BCTs, the resultant net gain to the Army 
will be nearly $204 million per IBCT (Appendix B).  Though there will be an initial 
cost to the Army of over $2.5 billion, the removal of these ARNG BCTs offsets 
this fiscal challenge in a period of just over seven years.  The financial aspects of 
this transformation are critical and will surely be a major consideration; however, 
we believe the suitability of these armored vehicles for the IW environment and 
the savings in terms of lives due to the increased survivability of these combat-
proven platforms are of greater importance.   
By 2013 the Army plans to integrate five additional BCTs to the AC, which 
will bolster the total number of AC BCTs to forty-eight, while the ARNG BCT 
                                            
59 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-03-671: 
Military Transformation: Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles 
Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, May 
2003). 
60 Peter Eisler, “The Truck the Pentagon Wants and the Firm That Makes It,” USA Today, 
October 2, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2007-08-01-force-protection-
mraps_N.htm (accessed September 17, 2008). 
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count will remain unchanged at twenty-eight.61  Under our proposal, the forty-
eight AC BCTs will be divided into twenty IBCTs (increased from eighteen), 
eleven SBCTs (increased from six), and five planned BCTs (either IBCT or 
SBCT), and will serve as the proponent for irregular warfare.  Furthermore, the 
current nineteen HBCTs will be decreased to twelve through the transfer of 
tracked vehicles to the ARNG, and will serve as the MCO proponent (Figure 11). 
We have chosen the BCT organization depicted in Figure 14 for three 
particular reasons.  The first reason is an attempt to keep HBCTs “divisionally” 
intact under the 1st Armored Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Infantry 
Division due to the existing infrastructure at their assigned posts which are 
conditioned to support mechanized and armor maneuver units.  The second is in 
an effort to keep intact the habitual relationship between air assault units, 
airborne units, and their aviation assets (i.e., 82nd ABN, 173rd ABN, and 101st 
AASLT) in order to maintain the Army’s forcible-entry capability.  The final reason 
is an attempt to overlay SBCTs with HBCTs (i.e., 1st and 4th ID) due to these 
units’ inherent knowledge of vehicular-based operations and familiarity with high-
mobility platforms. 
 
                                            
61 Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter Schoomaker, “A Statement on the 
Posture of the United States Army 2007,” Addendum H, February 14, 2007. 
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Figure 14.   Proposed 2013 BCT Organization 
 
C. PROPOSED MODIFIED ARMY FORCE GENERATION 
As depicted in Figure 7, the current ARFORGEN model places all units, 
regardless of organizational construct, within a unitary cycle for the purpose of 
sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  For reasons previously 
mentioned, we submit that this is the wrong approach, and therefore propose the 
creation of two separate tracks.  The first track is comprised of HBCTs and is 
focused primarily on MCO, while the second is made up of IBCTs and SBCTs 
and is focused primarily on the execution of IW.  Under our “Proposed MCO 
ARFORGEN Model” (Figure 15), the HBCTs of the AC will progress through 




Figure 15.   Proposed MCO ARFORGEN Model 
 
The first of these phases is the “Reset and Phase I Tasks“ period where 
units will focus on the following tasks: 
• Change of command 
• Mandatory block leave 
• Permanent Change of Station (PCS) movement 
• Equipment maintenance and deep refit (Level 5)  
• OES/NCOES professional development 
• Local/TRADOC schools (CLS, paramedic, Ranger, AASLT, ABN) 
• Civilian education 




The second phase is for the execution of “Phase II Tasks” where units 
engage in collective training as prescribed by their directed METL.  These tasks 
include: 
• Combined live-fire exercises 
• Situational training exercises 
• External evaluations 
• Battalion command-post exercises 
This phase will culminate in Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations for 
the battalions and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) rotations for 
brigade staffs focused on kinetic, force-on-force, conventional operations. 
Upon assumption of the third phase units are proven to be “Fully Mission 
Capable” (FMC) and are eligible for deployment or in-fact, deployed.  The 
proposed timeline for AC forces in this cycle is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   Proposed AC MCO Timeline 
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Although the Army National Guard appears to follow a similar cycle to the 
active units; this is not the case.  As in Figure 17 below, if units are actively 
engaged in MCO they will conduct the same Phase I tasks as the active 
component, but over a two-year time period.  They will likewise perform Phase II 
tasks in years three through five, culminating in either an active component-
observed and controlled external evaluation (EXEVAL), or a rotation to one of the 
CTCs.  For Guardsmen not actively engaged in MCO, and therefore not requiring 
a four-year dwell time, Phase I and II tasks will be completed over the course of a 
two-year span; however, in the second year, these units will be subject to 
assignment to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in support of Homeland 
Defense.  The exception to this is one BCT tasked to operate in the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), due to the symmetry of MCO forces versus the composition of 
North Korea’s military.  This unit will require a four-year dwell time upon the 
conclusion of its tour and therefore will be desynchronized with its original cohort.   
 
Figure 17.   Proposed ARNG MCO Timeline 
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Overall, this will provide the Army a sustained presence in the ROK for an 
indefinite period of time if not engaged in MCO.  If, however, engaged in MCO, 
this plan can only sustain the provision of four ARNG BCTs for MCO over a 
period of three years if the mandated four-year dwell time is observed.  Based on 
previous major combat operations, this should be well within the scope of the 
overall length of the conflict prior to such a time when primary responsibility for 
the contested region is transferred to IW forces. 
Under the “Proposed IW ARFORGEN Model” (Figure 18), the IBCTs and 
SBCTs of the AC will also follow a three year progression during which they will 
pass through three phases, each a year in length.   
 




During “Reset and Phase I Tasks,” IW units of the active component will 
conduct the following tasks:  
• Change of command 
• Mandatory block leave 
• Permanent Change of Station (PCS) movement 
• Equipment maintenance and deep refit (Level 5)  
• OES/NCOES professional development 
• Local/TRADOC schools (CLS, paramedic, Ranger, AASLT, ABN) 
• Civilian education 
• Individual soldier skills/small unit collective tasks 
• Language training 
• Cultural familiarization 
• Interpreter operations familiarization 
The second year, “Phase II Tasks,” is where units engage in collective 
training as prescribed by their directed METL.  These tasks include: 
• Combined live-fire exercises 
• Situational training exercises 
• External evaluations 
• Battalion command-post exercises 
• Anticipated area of operations regional study 
Similar to their MCO counterparts, units in this phase will culminate in a 
rotation to one of the Combat Training Centers for battalions and the Battle 
Command Training Program (BCTP) for brigade staffs.  However, the focus of 
these Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) will be on targeting IW centers of 
gravity such as the local populace and insurgent networks. 
Fully Mission Capable (FMC) units in the third phase are either deployed 
or eligible for deployment in support of global IW operations.  The proposed 
timeline for AC forces in this cycle is depicted in Figure 19. 
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As a footnote to this section, it will be necessary for the 82d Airborne 
Division and the 173 Airborne Brigade to be dual-hatted, with their primary role 
being that of an IW element, and their secondary role that of the Global 
Response Force (GRF).  Although primarily tasked with IW responsibilities, these 
unique units possess the only GPF airborne forcible entry capabilities, and 
therefore, are ideally suited as the GRF.  This requirement should not dilute their 
focus on IW.  Rather, it should inform their conduct of airborne operations as 
tactical exercises focused on the seizure and short-term holding of air heads for 
follow-on MCO elements. 
 
Figure 19.   Proposed AC IW Timeline 
 
For ARNG units in the IW track, there are two separate cycles (Figure 20).  
The first addresses units which have not been deployed, and are therefore not in 
need of the mandatory four-year dwell period.  These units will follow the same 
model as the AC, but remain subject to the Homeland Defense contingency in 
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their second year.  ARNG units that have been deployed, however, will follow the 
six year model as previously outlined for the MCO proponent within the Army 
National Guard (Figure 17), yet molded for an IW campaign.  One BCT will be 
tasked with providing support for the training of MiTTs at Fort Riley, Kansas, and 
will therefore be unavailable for four years following this.   
 
Figure 20.   Proposed ARNG IW Timeline 
 
Opponents of these cycles will argue that this creates an inability to 
“surge” forces in support of IW operations, and that there will be limited forces of 
varying types at the Army’s disposal for MCO.  Contrary to this, we argue that 
HBCTs can “surge” in support of IW operations to perform force protection tasks 
(i.e., Forward Operating Base security), thus relieving IW elements from this, 




Reciprocally, in the case of conventional operations, IW forces can bolster MCO 
elements during Phase II and Phase III, prior to assuming full responsibility for 
critical Phase IV operations (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21.   MCO to IW Handoff 
 
D. CONSIDERATIONS 
We understand that this transformation will not be without its challenges, 
specifically in terms of structure, organization, and administration.  In an effort to 
counter some of these, we make the following recommendations: 
• Create two separate Programs of Instruction (POIs) for CTCs 
• Establish centers of excellence for IW and MCO 
• Code positions within the two tracks with IW/MCO identifiers 
• Limit PCS options within specific IW or MCO career paths 
• Decentralize promotion boards for IW and MCO tracks 
• Institute a 36-month unit lifecycle 
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In order to properly train and certify elements of the IW and MCO tracks, 
Combat Training Centers will need to be flexible and provide units with scenarios 
in keeping with their assigned roles.  This will require the creation of two separate 
POIs, one IW-focused and one MCO-focused, in which the respective force type 
will undergo its training and evaluation.  The CTCs will also be tasked with 
statistically tracking the evidence of skill transferability to account for IW 
elements’ general preparedness in the role of supporting MCO.  With this, 
establish parallel centers of excellence for both IW and MCO at TRADOC to 
evaluate trends and best practices, and to serve as each force’s proponent within 
the Army’s hierarchy to inform OES and NCOES POIs.   
U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) will need to establish 
Army skill identifiers (ASIs) reflecting a soldier’s assignment in one track or the 
other.  For example, an Infantry officer, MOS 11A, will henceforth have the MOS 
of 11A(I0) (I0 identifying those in the IW track), or 11A(M0) (M0 identifying those 
in the MCO track).  The same will apply for all ranks and MOSs.  Additionally, 
soldiers will remain within their specific track throughout their careers.  To 
support this, soldiers will be limited to PCS moves to other units within the same 
track, saving money to the Army, and minimizing the hardships of relocation to 
Army families.  With the creation of two separate tracks the eventual evolution of 
two distinct cultures will arise, and consequentially, these two cultures may not 
necessarily value each other’s contribution to global security.  Therefore, a 
modification to the current officer and non-commissioned officer promotion 
system is prudent.  It is our recommendation that two separate boards be 
created; one for IW presided over by IW officers and NCOs, and likewise one for 
MCO.  This way, the specific skills and positions within each track are not 
devalued by prejudices or misunderstanding of unfamiliar roles.   
Our final recommendation calls for a three-year BCT lifecycle, instituted so 
that units experience minimal changes in personnel with the exception of losses 
due to retirements/early terminations of service, or the gain of soldiers to refill 
these positions.  This is not a novel idea, but a recommendation we insist upon to 
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provide solidarity to our proposal, as well as to remain consistent with the 
concepts of continuity, familiarity, and predictability for a unit and its soldiers’ 
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V. THE WAY AHEAD 
A. SYNOPSIS 
Over the course of this thesis, we have illuminated shortfalls of the current 
Army force structure and ARFORGEN process in their ability to effectively 
sustain dissimilar conflicts.  The United States has fortunately not been faced 
with such a challenging predicament; however, this does not justify a continued 
lack of preparedness due to a hope that multiple threats will not emerge.  Having 
first analyzed the points we believe to be of paramount concern in conducting 
simultaneous dissimilar operations, we have provided an alternative solution 
under which the Army can confidently face the likely emergence of dissimilar 
threats without the need to transition its force en masse to either one style of 
warfare or another.   
We have chosen not to alter the BCTs themselves as the foundation of the 
Army’s arsenal, nor have we suggested a radical departure from ARFORGEN as 
a proficient force management tool.  We do, however, believe that in order to 
rationally prepare for military intervention while facing bi-polar threats, 
modifications to the current systems must be considered and implemented.  We 
are not so naïve as to assume that this organizational and institutional change 
will not be met with some form of resistance from advocates of the current 
system.  It is our hope, however, that this thesis will incite some thought on the 
subject resulting in an honest evaluation of the Army’s current capabilities and 
modifications to its force structure and ARFORGEN process.  The final section of 
this paper is dedicated to subsequent measures that we feel are logical for the 




B. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
1. The First Step  
We believe the most imperative step in the process of transformation will 
be the gaining of support from senior Department of Defense and Congressional 
leaders.  In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act was signed into law in response to both operational and bureaucratic failures 
within the DoD.  In order to avoid repeating these mistakes and to facilitate the 
implementation of such bold organizational changes, we find it essential as a first 
step to convince policy and law-makers that deliberate proactive measures are 
prudent to avoid hasty reactive “patches” derived in a time of crisis.  
2. Recommendations for Further Study 
• Senior DoD and Congressional Support for Transformation 
• Supporting Study of Historical Institutional Transformations 
As mentioned above, successfully gaining the support of senior DoD and 
Congressional leaders is essential if this proposal or proposals similar to this are 
likely to succeed in transforming the Army.  This study can be tied in with lessons 
from historical institutional transformations in order to determine the optimal 
strategy for framing the argument and approaching civilian and military 
leadership. 
• BCT Transformation Time Line 
Further study is required to explore what timeline is necessary, integrated 
within the ARFORGEN cycle, in order for AC BCTs to successfully transform 
from the HBCT to IBCT or SBCT TO&E, and ARNG BCTs to transform from the 
IBCT or SBCT TO&E to the HBCT TO&E in accordance with this thesis. 
• Operational Hindrances Due to the Limited Size of the Army 
An entirely separate thesis should study how the Army is limited due to its 
current size, and what constraints will still be on the Army with its proposed 2013 
 53
troop strength.  This study could outline, for instance, exactly how many MCO 
and IW conflicts the Army can engage in, for what lengths of time, and with how 
many forces (BCTs) dedicated to each.  
• Retention and Recruiting Programs 
As a supplement to this thesis, an in-depth study of Army retention and 
recruiting programs to support the proposed transformation is necessary in order 
to provide U.S. Army Human Resources Command with a product to help 
facilitate their efforts. 
• Fit of IW Force Under Conventional Geographic Combatant 
Commands vs. Theater Special Operations Commands 
• Cultural Comparison of IW vs. MCO and Their Roles Under a 
Unified Command 
With IW forces taking on a historically Special Operations Force-like 
appearance in the conduct of operations, an exploration of the proper command 
of these new elements is essential.  Questions that may be studied are: 1) 
Should IW BCTs and conflicts fall under the responsibility of Theater Special 
Operations Commands (TSOC) and TSOC commanders, leaving MCO to the 
Geographical Combatant Commands and commanders?, and 2) What are the 
internal U.S. Army cultural impacts of the formation of these two separate 
elements, and what influence will this likely have on future promotion and 
selection boards, etc.?  
• Skill Transferability Between IW and MCO 
A long-term study of skill transferability between IW and MCO must be 
conducted to determine exactly what skills are not being learned through the 
conduct of IW, and vice versa.  This will allow the Army to tailor POIs within the 
OES and NCOES systems in order to create an area of general study for soldiers 




attending the Basic Non-commissioned Officer Course, the Advanced Non-
commissioned Officer Course, the Officer Basic Course, and the Captain’s 
Career Course, to name a few.   
• Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations  
Lastly, Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations 
(SSTRO) must be addressed as they are essential elements of the 
comprehensive Joint Operating Concept.  A separate study of the requirements 
of SSTRO is necessary in order to determine the suitability of IW and/or MCO 
forces in this role, and whether this role will be supported or supporting in 
conjunction with Special Operations Forces and civilian government agencies. 
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF UNI-FOCUSED FAILURE 
In other words, great powers often do poorly in small wars simply 
because they are great powers that must embrace a big-war 
paradigm by necessity. 
    -Robert M. Cassidy62 
A. CHECHEN WARS (1999) 
1. Background 
The Chechen capitol city of Grozny lies a mere 900 miles to the south of 
Moscow, yet the two cities are culturally worlds apart.  Marked by years of 
friction, the Russo-Chechen relationship has always been tumultuous, but has 
further degraded since the demise of the former Soviet Union in 1991.  First 
recognized as a “distinct people” in the seventeenth century, Chechens actively 
opposed Russian occupation of the Caucasus region during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  In 1858, efforts to create an independent Islamic state 
by Chechen leader Imam Shamil and his fighters were halted by Russian 
intervention.63  Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chechnya again 
attempted independence, but this too was quelled by the Bolsheviks.  In the mid 
1930s the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region (Figure 22)64, an area 
established in 1924 by Russia’s Bolshevik government, “became an autonomous 
republic.”65  
                                            
62 Robert M. Cassidy, Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and 
the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army 
War College, 2003). 
63 Anup Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya,” http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp 
(accessed May 19, 2008). 
64 Created by the Bolshevik government following the Chechen declaration of independence 
in 1917, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region encompasses the Chechen and Ingushetia 
peoples who are predominantly of Sunni Muslim heritage.  These regions have vastly different 
cultural and religious beliefs as stated by Anup Shah in his article “Crisis in Chechnya.”  
65 Anup Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya,” http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp 
(accessed May 19, 2008).  
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Figure 22.   Chechen-Ingush Map66 
 
However, due to alleged collaboration with Germans during World War II 
this union would be short-lived.  At the hand of Russian dictator Joseph Stalin, an 
estimated 400,000-800,000 Chechens were deported to Siberia and Central 
Asia, of which up to 100,000 reportedly perished from “extreme conditions.”67  In 
1956, with Nikita Khrushchev’s rise to power, these exiled Chechens were 
permitted to return and subsequently reestablished the fledgling Chechen-Ingush 
Republic.68  This Republic continued under the auspices of the Soviet Union for 
more than thirty years until the latter’s failure in 1991, at which time Chechnya, 
as well as many former Soviet regions, attempted to declare its independence.  
In 1992, Ingushetia gained independence from Chechnya “and became an 
autonomous republic within the Russian Federation.”  Concurrently, former 
Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev gained control of Grozny and 
                                            
66 “Chechnya,” Wikipedia.com, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chechnya (accessed May 20, 
2008). 
67 Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya.” 
68 BBC News, “Regions and Territories: Chechnya,” BBC.co.uk, March 12, 2008, 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/25
65049.stm (accessed May 15, 2008). 
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initiated Chechnya’s latest campaign for independence.69  However, in an 
attempt to prevent further fracture of the former Soviet states and to maintain 
control of Chechnya’s oil-rich land, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin 
dismissed Chechnya’s aspiration for independence with the deployment of 
hundreds of Interior Ministry troops to the region.70  Faced with an armed 
Chechen opposition, the Russians quickly withdrew their forces while tension 
between Moscow and President Dudayev continued.  In 1994, elements of the 
Russian military invaded Chechnya with the expectation of rapidly destroying any 
opposition.  The once mighty Soviet forces, however, quickly proved to be no 
match for the guerilla tactics of the Chechen separatists.  In 1996, Russian forces 
ashamedly withdrew from Chechnya, but only after decimating the capitol city of 
Grozny and leaving 70,000-80,000 dead (mostly civilian casualties) in their 
wake.71  Following the withdrawal of Russian forces, a 1996 peace agreement 
was struck granting Chechnya increased autonomy, but still not its 
independence.  This, coupled with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov’s 
inability to control newly emerging warlords, and Russia’s failure to assist in 
rebuilding vital infrastructure within Chechnya, led to an August 1999 declaration 
of holy war on Russia by Chechen fighters and Islamists from the Russian 
Republic of Dagestan they were supporting.  Although this uprising was quickly 
suppressed, a wave of presumably Chechen bombings within Russia that 
resulted in hundreds of deaths compelled Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
to once again send military forces to the region.  As was true of the 1994 
campaign, this latest incursion resulted in a large number of casualties on both 
sides, and furthered the degradation of vital Chechen infrastructure.  Despite a 
2003 referendum allowing for an improved constitution that provides Chechnya 
with greater autonomy, the fighting in Chechnya persists as its people continue to  
 
                                            
69 Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya.” 
70 BBC News, “Regions and Territories: Chechnya.” 
71 Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya.” 
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seek independence from Russian authority.  As Henry Kissinger noted in his 
article The Vietnam Negotiations, “The guerilla wins if he does not lose.  The 
conventional army loses if it does not win.”72 
2. Russian Military Forces 
The contemporary Russian military reflects a centuries-long evolution from 
its imperial era through the Soviet period.  As Robert Cassidy notes, former 
“Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice’s 
characterization of the Soviet Military:  ‘Reliance on the military power of the 
state, acquired at great cost and organized like that of military powers of the past, 
was handed down to the Soviets by historical experience.’”73  Having felt the 
pains of “attritional wars” in its revolution, official Russian military doctrine 
formalized its aversion to small conflicts and solidified its orientation on “offensive 
warfare employing large-scale combined arms formations suitable to the terrain 
of the central European plateau. Tanks, infantry, and artillery played the principle 
role.”74  Russian doctrine calls for total war, and therefore, “The…Russian armed 
forces that attacked Grozny were structured and trained for large-scale 
conventional warfare.”75  A 1992 Russian Ministry of Defense draft security 
document stated “that NATO remained the long-term threat but that regional 
conflicts and low-intensity warfare were more probable.  However, the type of 
military doctrine and forces required for these two types of conflicts seemed 
irreconcilable.”76   
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75 Ibid., 11. 
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3. Analysis 
The fledgling Chechen army defeated a Eurasian great power’s 
ostensibly superior army because it was able to use conventional 
tactics in an unorthodox manner to concentrate against Russian 
Army weaknesses.  This quote highlights the importance of learning 
from the Russian experience in Chechnya, and incorporating that 
into U.S. military doctrine, as is reflected in earlier references to the 
tactics of asymmetric adversaries.  The Chechen army, although 
vastly outnumbered and outgunned, utilized “hit and run” tactics 
associated with irregular warfare that seeks to incrementally attrite 
an opponent’s military force, frustrate its commanders, and most 
importantly, weaken the resolve of the government and its 
constituency.  Russian military forces in Chechnya were inflexible 
and did not adapt for proficiency in irregular warfare.  As Cassidy 
notes, Dudayev’s Army was limited in personnel, resources, and 
training [and] he soon realized that committing his troops to open 
battle against the Russians would invite disaster.  The Russians, 
however, not understanding the tactics necessary for defeating an 
insurgency used more force less discriminately in their pursuit of 
the guerillas. 77  
This is directly tied to “great power” status, and Russia’s desire to maintain 
that in the modern era.  Russia chooses to “maintain a central competence in 
symmetric warfare to preserve their great power status vis-à-vis other great 
powers,” and ignore the need to adapt its military for competency on the irregular 
battlefield.78  As long as Russia continues its paradigm for conventional warfare, 
success will not be realized vis-à-vis irregular threats, and its counterinsurgency 
efforts in Chechnya will never conclude in success. 
No two historians ever agree on what happened, and the damn 
thing is they both think they’re telling the truth. 
    -Harry S. Truman79 
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B. SECOND LEBANON WAR / JULY WAR (2006) 
1. Background 
Conquered by Hebrew King David in 1000 B.C. and later the Arab armies 
of Caliph Umar in 638, the rightful claim to Jerusalem has been under contention 
for the greater portion of recorded history.80  Jews and Muslims alike have 
legitimate religious and historical affiliation to this holy city that continues to serve 
as the basis for contention in this region today.  The Jewish claim has its 
foundation in the Old Testament where it is written that King David, following the 
capture of Jerusalem, established the kingdom of the Israelites there.  
Conversely, Muslims regard Jerusalem as a holy place due to its traditional 
recognition as the city from which Muhammed ascended into heaven.81   
Following the Arab seizure of Jerusalem in 638, Christians and Jews of 
Palestine82 were permitted to practice their chosen religions, but over time “the 
local population gradually accepted Islam and the Arab-Islamic culture of their 
rulers.”83  By the late nineteenth century, approximately six percent of Palestine 
was occupied by Jews, and due to the imposition of harsh limitations on 
“immigration and land purchase” by the ruling Ottoman Empire dissention arose 
and the Zionist movement was formed.  In 1897, this movement formalized with 
the meeting of the first Zionist congress, at which time the goals of establishing a 
homeland for Jews in Palestine through the voluntary departure of Arabs to Arab 
                                            
80 Ami Isseroff, “Israel and Palestine: A Brief History,” Mideastweb.org, April 7, 2008, 
http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm (accessed May 21, 2008). 
81 Ibid. 
82 The name Palestine has its roots in the biblical word Plesheth, or as it is called in English, 
Philistine.  “The name Palestine refers to a region of the eastern Mediterranean coast from the 
sea to the Jordan valley and from the southern Negev desert to the Galilee lake region in the 
north.”  Over time the name changed, but was revived following WWI and the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire when Great Britain was given mandate over Palestine. Early History Palestine Origin, 
“Where Did the Name Palestine Come From?,” PalestineFacts.org, 2008, 
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_early_palestine_name_origin.php (accessed May 29, 2008). 
83 Isseroff, “Israel and Palestine: A Brief History.” 
 61
lands was set.84  This, however, would not happen until the conclusion of World 
War I when the League of Nations granted portions of the Ottoman Empire to 
Great Britain as a spoil of war.  Eager to keep Palestine from French control, the 
British requested a mandate to establish the “Jewish national home” there, and 
following a great deal of Arab opposition to Jewish governance, the American-
backed mandate was approved, and the British government was granted 
“provisional mandate over Palestine.”85  
By the 1930s, Jewish immigration increased due to persecution in Europe.  
This immigration became increasingly greater during World War II with the 
formation of Jewish illegal immigration networks that aided Jews fleeing Nazi 
persecution.  Following WWII, the United Nations Special Commission on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended the division of Palestine into separate Arab 
and Jewish states.”86  Ratified in 1947, this recommendation was welcomed by 
Jews, but adamantly opposed by Arabs.  Israel “proclaimed its independence” in 
1948, and through means of war, quickly seized seventy-seven percent of the 
territory of Palestine forcing more than half of the Palestinian population to flee.87  
The remaining Palestinian territory was annexed by Egypt and Jordan effectively 
eliminating the realization of a Palestinian state.   
Since Israel’s declaration of independence, numerous wars and small 
engagements have defined relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.  
Elements of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), comprised of 
Palestinian exiles living in southern Lebanon, as well as numerous other 
dissident organizations, have arisen and continually clashed with Israeli Defense 
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Forces (IDF).  In 1982, members of one such group, the Abu Nidal88 terrorist 
organization shot and killed Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov while in England.  
In response to this, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon initiated an invasion of 
Lebanon.  During this, the IDF had its first encounter with elements of the newly 
formed Shi’ia militant organization Hezbollah (party of Allah), a group formed with 
the assistance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).89  Adding to the 
problems in Lebanon, in September, 1982, (pro-Israel) Lebanese President-elect 
Bashir Gemayel was killed by an alleged Syrian bomb plot that served as the 
catalyst for Lebanon’s descent into anarchy.  Israel eventually withdrew the 
majority of its forces but maintained a highly controversial presence in southern 
Lebanon until 2000.  In 2006, Hezbollah “in a gesture of solidarity with the radical 
Palestinian organization Hamas,” launched rocket attacks on northern Israel 
while apprehending three IDF soldiers for use in bartering for Hezbollah 
prisoners held in Israel.90  Responding to this, “Israel launched widespread air 
and artillery strikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and Lebanese infrastructure 
including Beirut International Airport, vowing to continue the attacks until the 
Israeli Hostages are returned.”91  Thirty-three days and some ten billion dollars in 
infrastructure damage later, it is estimated that between seventy and six hundred 
Hezbollah fighters laid dead, and nine hundred to eleven hundred Lebanese 
civilians killed, at the cost of over one hundred soldiers and four aircraft to 
Israel.92  Under international pressure, Israel was forced to withdraw from 
Lebanon in defeat, never able to counter the nearly four thousand rockets fired 
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across its borders at the hands of the Arabs, and with its image of strength under 
question within the world community.93  Conversely, Hezbollah under Secretary 
General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah succeeded in its goal of seeking “to take 
actions to prove its strength and dominance.”94 
2. Israeli Defense Forces 
On May 15, 1948, the day the British Mandate over Palestine 
ended, the armies of five neighboring Arab states invaded the new 
State of Israel, which had declared its independence the previous 
day.95  
Vastly outnumbered and lacking the tools of war, the Haganah,96 the Irgun 
Zeva’i Le’ummi, and the Lohamei Herut (all separate elements of existing Jewish 
defense forces) combined and “agreed to cease their independent activities” in 
an effort to fuse their capabilities.  On May 28, 1948, Israeli Prime Minister David 
Ben-Gurion signed Israel Ordinance No. 4 effectively establishing the existing 
land, navy, and air forces as the Israeli Defense Forces97  Due to the crisis 
condition of the time, mandatory conscription was enacted as the entire Israeli 
society mobilized for the survival of their new state.  Israel succeeded in 
defending its independence, and through modernization evolved into a 
competent military.  Today, Israel’s military is the most powerful in the region, 
and the willingness of its people to mobilize in support of Israel’s survival 
persists.   
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As implied in its name, Israel’s military is a defensive force with the 
mission of protecting “the existence and territorial sovereignty of the state of 
Israel [through] a strong deterrent capacity to dissuade potential enemies from 
attacking.”98  However, because of its limited land mass, Israeli doctrine states 
that “…Israel must prevent the enemy from entering its territory, and must quickly 
transfer the battle to enemy territory.”99  Due to its relatively small population, 
Israel has encountered difficulty maintaining a sizeable standing military, and 
therefore “relies heavily on its reserve forces…in time of war.”100   
Although Israel achieved decisive victories in conventional wars between 
1948 and 1973, and has had a great deal of success using its special missions 
units (the Sayaret and Unit 101) in combating terrorist, Hezbollah remains a 
figurative thorn in Israel’s side due to the fact that conflicts with Hezbollah have 
historically resulted in Israel’s defeat or capitulation to UN mandates.101  This 
was highlighted most recently in 2006 with Israel’s embarrassing defeat at the 
hands of Hezbollah which led to harsh criticism of “Israel’s senior war-time 
leaders,” and the exposure of numerous flaws within the IDF.”102 
3. Analysis 
Israel’s war with Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon during the summer of 2006 
revealed multiple weaknesses within the IDF.  The first of these was Israel’s 
inability to effectively communicate accurate battle damage assessments 
between its air and ground forces.  As stated by Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry 
in their article, How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, While Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) units had been making forays into southern Lebanon during the second 
week of the conflict, the Israeli military leadership remained undecided over when 
                                            




102 Eric Westervelt, “Israeli Report Criticizes Olmert for Lebanon Action”, NPR.org, May 29 
2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9924495 (accessed May 29, 2008). 
 65
and where – even whether – to deploy their ground units.”  This indecisiveness 
was due “In part” to the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF) claims that strategic goals were 
being met through air power, and that “just one more day” was required to 
achieve success; this apparently was not the case.103  On July 22, the U.S. 
began shipments of precision weapons to Israel, and indication to Pentagon 
officials “…that Israel had expended most of its munitions in the wars first 10 
days…”104  The reporting of the IAF drastically conflicted with IDF units already 
positioned in southern Lebanon who reported “Hezbollah units were fighting 
tenaciously to hold their positions.”105  In response to this, Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Olmert decided to “deploy the full might of the IDF to defeat Hezbollah” and 
initiated the call-up of the reserves for the purpose of “buttress[ing] forces already 
fighting in southern Lebanon, and to add weight to the ground assault.”106   
This call-up of reserve forces led to a second issue, that is, Israel’s 
inability to provide them with the necessary “food, ammunition and even water 
[that] reached units a full 24-48 hours behind a unit’s appearance in its assigned 
northern deployment zones.”107  Israel’s focus on a “qualitative lead” to 
compensate for is “quantitative disadvantage” had apparently created a logistical 
gap that only became apparent in this time of quantitative necessity.108  These 
two issues were further frustrated by the strategy of Brigadier General Ido 
Nehushtan, a member of Israel’s general staff, who stated that the IDF must 
concentrate on the need to “disrupt the military logic” of Hezbollah.109  This  
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ambiguous tactic of “disrupting the military logic” caused a great deal of 
confusion among ground commanders of the IDF who were left “wonder[ing] 
exactly what the war’s goals were.”110   
In the end, Hezbollah executed its defense using only three thousand 
troops of the Nasr Brigade versus the entire might of the IDF.  “Hezbollah 
commanders found Israeli troops were poorly organized and disciplined,” and 
never indicated any intention of activating reserves of their own.111  IDF 
commanders too had a poor assessment of their troop’s performance “noting a 
signal lack of discipline even among [their] best-trained regular soldiers.  The 
reserves were worse, and IDF commanders hesitated to put them into battle.”112 
The IDF has spent the majority of its existence dealing with the police-like 
actions closely associated with counterinsurgency against Hamas, Hezbollah and 
the PLO.  This focus on irregular warfare, although necessary to a degree, has 
left their military decrepit and questioning its ability to conduct major combat 
operations.  As one Hezbollah commander stated following the July War, “The 
IDF was ‘a motley assortment…But that’s what happens when you have spent 
four decades firing rubber bullets at women and children in the West Bank and 
Gaza’.”113   
The U.S. should note this as a warning against focusing its military 
strength on one niche of conflict, and appreciate the need for a balanced force 
capable of irregular as well as conventional operations.  Continued focus on 
counterinsurgency on the part of the IDF has the potential to leave Israel 
vulnerable to its Arab neighbors and in a weakened state of preparedness, where 
the need for U.S. intervention or the use of strategic weapons may be the only 
option for its survival.  
                                            





The U.S. Army can learn many valuable lessons from both the Russian 
experience in Chechnya as well as Israel’s recent debacle in Lebanon.  It is our 
belief that the most important of these is the recognition of the need for, and the 
development of the ability to understand the enemy.  The U.S. Army should not 
focus its efforts on the style of warfare it is most comfortable and familiar with; it 
should tailor elements of the force to symmetrically cope with what it categorizes 
as asymmetric threats.  It is only when the Army is capable of meeting all threats 
symmetrically that it will be fully prepared to execute operations globally in a 
succinct, coherent manner.  It is in this that the Russian and Israeli armies have 
failed in their recent exploits, as alluded to earlier in the body of this thesis 
(Chapter IV, “Game Theory”), and why the U.S. Army has had such a difficult 
time fighting an insurgency following the fall of Baghdad in 2003.  These 
examples are directly tied to this thesis in the respect that our recommendations 
provide a remedy to these problems of asymmetry through the prescription that a 
portion of the Army be dedicated to dealing with irregular threats, while the 
remainder is reserved as a respondent and deterrent for major combat 
operations.  In this, the Army will view no enemy as asymmetric because it will 
have units trained, equipped, and capable of symmetrical employment vis-à-vis 
conventional and irregular threats alike.   
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APPENDIX B:  PAY SAVINGS VS STRYKER/MRAP ACQUISITION 
COST 
 
Figure 23.   IBCT Active Duty and Drill Pay Comparison 
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Figure 24.   Vehicle Procurement Cost Savings 
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APPENDIX D:  DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 
General Purpose Forces 
IW JOC: The regular armed forces of a country, other than nuclear 
forces and special operations forces, that are organized, trained, and equipped to 
perform a broad range of missions across the range of military operations.  Also 
called GPF. (Proposed) 
Irregular 
IW JOC: Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in 
which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other 
nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of 
the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country.  
See also conventional, nonconventional. (Proposed) 
Irregular Forces 
JP 1-02: Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the 
regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. 
Irregular Warfare 
IW JOC: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors 
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, 
and will.  Also called IW. (Proposed) 
Major Operation 
JP 1-02:  A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) 
conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time 
and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.  
These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a 
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common plan and are controlled by a single commander.  For noncombat 
operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. 
Nonconventional 
IW JOC: Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., for 
which the regular armed forces of a country, excluding designated special 
operations forces, do not have a broad-based requirement for the conduct of 
combat operations against the regular armed forces of another country.  This 
term included the employment of conventional forces and capabilities in 
nonstandard ways for nonstandard purposes.  (Proposed) 
Operational Environment 
JP 3-0: A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and 
influences that affect the employment of capabilities ad bear on the decision of 
the commander. 
Reconstruction 
SSTRO JOC: The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or 
destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or 
territory to create the foundation for longer-term development. 
Security 
SSTRO JOC: The establishment of a safe and secure environment 
for the local populace, host nation military and civilian organizations as well as 
USG and coalition agencies, which are conducting SSTR operations.  
Stability Operations 
JP 1-02: An overarching term encompassing various military 
missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in 
coordination with other instrument of national power to maintain or reestablish a 
safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, 
emergency infrastructure, reconstruction and humanitarian relief. 
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Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations 
Authors: Highly integrated military, civilian, interagency and 
international operations conducted across the continuum from peace to crisis and 
conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has 
collapsed due to either a natural or man-made disaster.114 
Stabilization 
SSTRO JOC: Activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions, 
to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems, 
to create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the preconditions 
for reconstruction efforts. 
Transition 
SSTRO JOC: The process of shifting the lead responsibility and 
authority for helping provide of foster security, essential services, humanitarian 
assistance, economic development, and political governance from the 
intervening military and civilian agencies to the host nation.  Transitions are event 
driven and will occur within the major mission elements (MMEs) at the point 
when the entity assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity 
to carry out the relevant activities.  
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